W
hen Hurricane Katrina came through the Gulf in August 2005, it displaced almost the entire population of New Orleans, scattering residents across the region, state, and country. By the fall of 2006, almost half the residents had returned, and almost two-thirds had returned by the fall of 2007, nearly two years after the hurricane. Th ese return rates were very close to early estimates produced by RAND researchers, which highlighted the important eff ects of fl ooding and housing damage on return rates. A question remained, however: Which residents have returned and which have not, and how are these people aff ected by the trauma caused by such a massive displacement?
To help answer this question, RAND researchers fi elded an innovative pilot survey in the fall of 2006-the Displaced New Orleans Residents Pilot Survey (DNORPS). Th e goal was to establish the feasibility of identifying a representative sample of pre-Katrina residents of New Orleans, determine the likely success of eff orts to track and interview this sample in a major longitudinal study, and ultimately to launch the full-scale version-the Displaced New Orleans Residents Survey (DNORS), currently under way. Th e researchers also sought to gain insights into the recovery of the New Orleans population by examining rates of displaced residents returning to the city and the well-being of displaced residents.
What Is DNORPS?
DNORPS is an area-based probability sample of pre-Katrina dwellings in the City of New Orleans, where the dwellings were stratifi ed based on three levels of fl ood depth on August 31, 2005-no fl ooding, up to four feet, and four feet or more (see Figure 1) . Th e fi rst stratum, areas with no fl ooding, included about 29 percent of all dwellings in New Orleans. Th e second stratum, areas with less than four feet of fl ooding, accounted for about 20 percent of all dwellings. Finally, areas with four or more feet of fl ooding composed the third stratum, which included 51 percent of dwellings. Flood depth was directly tied to housing damage in previous RAND work and, thus, represents a potentially crucial factor shaping residents' ability and choice about whether to return to the city and in understanding fi nancial and other dimensions of well-being.
Th e survey questionnaire collected demographic information; information about evacuation and resettlement experience, including when
Key fi ndings:
• Results from the Displaced New Orleans Residents Pilot Study (DNORPS) show that rates of return and mental illness vary by sociodemographic factors, particularly race.
• Housing damage is strongly associated with higher levels of mental illness and accounts for ongoing displacement.
• Fielding the DNORPS shows that it is possible to study this hard-to-survey population and that a full-scale survey is feasible; the challenge is in locating cases.
• RAND researchers analyzed the data for insights on the population's recovery. Using the data, researchers estimated that New Orleans would ultimately regain more than twothirds of its displaced residents. In the fall of 2006, approximately one-half of residents had returned to New Orleans, and nearly all those planned to stay. Analysis also found essentially no variation in this high likelihood of remaining in the city by fl ood zone, which is remarkable given the vastly diff erent living environments of fl ooded and nonfl ooded residents. At the same time, among the 51 percent of residents who had not yet returned, the likelihood of moving back was modest. Of those still displaced, the majority (61 percent) had no plans to return within a year of the interview (i.e., within two years following the hurricane).
Interestingly, the likelihood of returning was higher among residents in fl ooded parts of the city, which likely refl ects the eff ects of unfi nished reconstruction eff orts, such as repairing or replacing damaged housing and waiting for neighborhood infrastructure to be reestablished. In unfl ooded parts of the city, few additional displaced residents were likely to return if they had not done so already. Th e results suggest that perhaps the most eff ective way to help displaced New Orleanians return to the city is to increase the availability of low-cost housing to renters who are still away from the city but would like to return.
Th e researchers also looked at how the pace of return varied by race, socioeconomic status, and education. Th e pace of return among blacks was much slower-but more steady-than for whites, as shown in Figure 2 , which plots the likelihood, over time, of returning to the city among those living away. For whites, it peaked three months after Katrina and then declined very rapidly over the subsequent six months. It remained close to zero for whites after month 9 (May 2006), indicating that few, if any, whites who had not returned to the city by that time were likely to do so. For blacks, however, the likelihood of returning peaked at about fi ve months following the hurricane and declined relatively modestly over the subsequent months. By the end of the study period, for displaced blacks, the likelihood of returning, although low, was considerably higher than for whites, indicating that blacks continued to return to the city in small numbers. Th e researchers found that diff erences in housing damage experienced by blacks and whites largely accounted for the race disparity in return rates.
Finally, the researchers used the DNORPS data to better understand mental illness among New Orleanians who experienced Katrina and its aftermath. Th ey found very high levels of mental illness among the population: Nearly 40 percent had probable mental illness one year after the storm, and half of these illnesses were classifi ed as severe. Th ese rates were substantially higher than rates of mental illness prior to Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf States region. According to the National Comorbidity Survey Replication study conducted between 2001 and 2003, rates of severe, moderate, and any mental illness were estimated at 6 percent, 10 percent, and 16 percent, respectively. Th e high levels of mental illness suggest that the prevalence of mental illness may not have declined in the year following the hurricanea fi nding that diff ers from the pattern described in most previous research on mental illness following disasters. While the researchers found disparities between blacks and whites in terms of mental illness prevalence and severity, the disparities were largely accounted for by other factorsin particular, the eff ect of severe damage to individuals' homes. Th is eff ect may have been economic, because, for most families who owned their homes, equity in their property represented their largest wealth component. Uninsured property losses from fl ooding were thus potentially devastating, while fl ood insurance was unlikely to have been sufficient to cover household contents or the loss of use of a home. Apart from the fi nancial losses, survivors whose housing was severely damaged or destroyed may have been unable to return to their neighborhoods or even to the city, which may have aff ected their social ties, employment, and other factors.
Why Is DNORS Important?
Studying population change in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and the well-being of New Orleanians who experienced Katrina has been challenging because valid and generalizable results require data that are representative of everyone and outcome measures that are relevant for describing the posthurricane experience. Some population groups are diffi cult to fi nd. For example, it is harder to track and interview those who have resettled away from New Orleans, and, furthermore, national studies that do include displaced New Orleans residents may not track relevant outcomes and may provide only a brief window for examining their circumstances.
Building on the experience from the pilot study, DNORS will fi ll a gap in the current set of surveys that examine New Orleans' displaced residents, falling between early, small-scale surveys of evacuees, medium-scale, regionally representative ones, and larger-scale national ones (see table) . DNORS complements and supplements these other surveys, capturing individuals who experienced Katrina but left the area and examining more outcomes of interest for a broader range of the displaced population.
How Feasible Is It to Identify a Representative Sample?
Th e DNORPS was fi elded in the fall of 2006 with a sample size of 344 households, a number driven by the budget; 325 households were determined to be eligible (the remaining households were vacant or had no surviving members). Th e researchers located 212 households, or about two-thirds of those eligible, and completed interviews for 147 of them, providing information on a total of 386 individuals. Th ere were few systematic diff erences in fi eldwork outcomes by demographic factors, socioeconomic status, and housing characteristics across any of the fi eldwork stages. Have well-designed samples and high response rates, provide key insights into location and well-being of representative samples of displaced New Orleans residents, and offer comparisons with national population but focus on a limited number of outcomes and provide only a snapshot, with no data after the one-year mark
DNORPS Complements and Supplements Other Surveys
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Conclusions
Results from fi elding the DNORPS have yielded some important insights. Th e overall implication of the results for the future population of New Orleans is likely only very modest growth from the return of still-displaced residents. Th e city will continue its post-Katrina trend of being older, whiter, and more highly educated and of having fewer families, children, and people out of the labor force; displaced residents will continue to suff er from mental illness caused by the trauma of Katrina and the displacement experience. While socioeconomic disparities show up in the rate of return and mental illness fi ndings, both sets of fi ndings appear to be driven by the level of housing damage. Th e DNORS fi lls a gap in the existing surveys of displaced New Orleans residents, both supplementing and complementing currently available data. It is feasible to survey this diffi cult-to-fi nd population, and the pilot survey has laid the foundations for the full-scale survey now under way; lessons learned from the pilot show that the key challenge will be identifying, locating, and contacting a high fraction of sampled cases.
Overall, DNORPS results provide a useful foundation for launching a larger-scale panel survey of displaced New Orleans residents to study the social and economic wellbeing of this population over the coming years. But beyond that, the fi ndings may also be relevant to studying the eff ects of human-caused disasters (such as a large-scale terrorist attack) or natural disasters in other settings (such as major earthquakes). Longitudinal studies are useful for providing an ongoing assessment of the population eff ects of a disaster. Th ey allow researchers to determine for whom the disaster is an experience from which they will never recover-and for whom ongoing support is essential-and to identify individuals for whom the disaster may have been a life-altering experience for the better. ■ This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation.
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